期权模型在财产保险偿付能力研究中的应用

期权模型已广泛应用于金融保险业。本文将期权定价模型运用于财产保险的偿付能力分析。在保险被视为公司的负债且保险的需求函数与偿付能力不足风险成反比的假设下,可通过选择偿付能力不足风险的水平来实现保险人的利润最大化。     

侵权行为的经济分析

经济分析法学是西方法学界和经济学界发展最快的领域之一,运用经济学的方法对法律问题加以阐释,效率与均衡被认定为法律制度的核心理念。特别是在侵权领域引入经济学理论,对侵权行为的责任承担、损害赔偿的事后研究转向了事先分析。因此,从预防成本与预防收益之间的关系对侵权行为的归责原则进行效率分析,并借助“亨德公式”对两种不同的损害赔偿进行经济界定,权衡由侵权行为引起的社会成本差异,当预防的成本小于预防的预期收益,侵权人的预防是必要的、有效率的。如未采取有效的预防措施,侵权人的行为就是无效的,就要受到法律的惩罚。     

Does risk sharing increase with risk aversion and risk when commitment is limited?

I consider a risk-sharing game with limited commitment, and study how the discount factor above which perfect risk sharing is self-enforcing in the long run depends on agents׳ risk aversion and the riskiness of their endowment. When agents face no aggregate risk, a mean-preserving spread may destroy the sustainability of perfect risk sharing if each agent׳s endowment may take more than three values. With aggregate risk the same can happen with only two possible endowment realizations. With respect to risk aversion the intuitive comparative statics result holds without aggregate risk, but it holds only under strong assumptions in the presence of aggregate risk. In simple settings with two endowment values I also show that the threshold discount factor co-moves with popular measures of risk sharing.     

外来者劣势与海外并购企业的生产率提升

海外并购已成为新兴经济体企业对外投资和实现国际化扩张的重要战略选择。外来者劣势是中国企业海外并购活动面临着的诸多困难之一。“外来者”身份会对企业并购后的整合与生产率提升这一关键问题产生负面影响,化解负面影响需作深入的细化研究。选取2008-2015年中国上市企业共计197起海外并购事件,以制度距离、文化距离以及地理距离分别作为外来者劣势中合法性缺失和信息不对称的替代变量,分析外来者劣势对海外并购企业生产率提升的作用机制。结果显示,合法性缺失导致的外来者劣势对海外并购企业的生产率提升有显著负影响,但信息不对称对生产率的影响并不显著。调节效应检验结果表明,国内投资能显著弱化制度距离和文化距离引致的外来者劣势对海外并购企业生产率的负影响,国际化经验和出口能克服制度距离带来的合法性问题,但对文化距离带来的合法性缺失的弱化效果并不明显。     

Precision and Manipulation of Non-financial Information: The Curious Case of Environmental Liability

This paper develops a model showing how the environmental liability regime and the precision of the disclosed environmental performance indicator affect managers’ incentives (1) to reduce actual pollution and (2) to manipulate the reported pollution. I assume a company with a separation of ownership and control which can be held liable for environmental damages and distinguish between a negligence regime and strict liability. The results suggest that if there is no manipulation but only a lack of precision of the disclosed environmental performance indicator, a negligence rule induces lower actual pollution levels than strict liability even though a negligence rule is considered to be more lenient. If managers are able to manipulate the disclosed environmental performance indicator, they will do so and actual pollution levels will generally increase. While manipulation makes it easier for shareholders to escape liability under a negligence regime, shareholders suffer from manipulation under strict liability due to higher actual pollution and higher expected damage compensation payments. Therefore, the manipulation level is higher under a negligence regime. My analysis contributes to the environmental performance and disclosure literature by showing that the liability regime is an important determinant affecting environmental reporting and actual pollution decisions.     

Limited attention,share repurchases,and takeover risk

We hypothesize that announcing open market share repurchases (OMRs) to counter negative valuation shocks reveals repurchasing firms’ lost growth opportunities or underperforming assets to potential bidders, making them more likely to become takeover targets. This also leads their investors to face higher takeover risk, a systematic risk associated with economic fundamentals that drive takeover waves, as proposed by Cremers et al. (2009). Indeed, we find that repurchasing firms tend to face higher takeover probability in the first few years following their OMR announcements, and that the increase in takeover risk can largely explain their post-announcement long-run abnormal returns documented in the literature. The increase in takeover risk is larger for smaller firms, firms with poorer pre-announcement stock performance, and those attracting more attention of market participants. Our results suggest that OMRs, which are used by many firms to counter undervaluation, could make the firms more sensitive to takeover waves and raise their cost of equity capital.     

Assessment of the Partnership Quality between Travel Agencies and Health Care Organizations on the International Medical Tourism Market in Taiwan

The medical tourism literature lacks insight into related issues of these types of partnerships. Those that integrate multiple perspectives into one research framework are especially rare. This study evaluated and compared the influence of external environment uncertainty, trust, and resource dependence perspectives on the quality of interorganizational partnerships in the international medical tourism market and quantified these elements using external environment uncertainty assessment on the international medical tourism development. The research sample was based on a survey from 161 travel agency managers in Taiwan. This study found that external environment uncertainty has direct negative impact on trust and resource dependence has a positive influence on interorganizational partnership. Moreover, trust has a significant impact on partnership quality while resource dependence does not. Therefore, medical travel agents should extend their network of trustworthy health care organization partners in order to improve performance, decrease their self-risk, collect information, and avoid missed opportunities.     

民营资本的进入对我国风电产业发展的影响——基于断点回归的分析

为克服单差法存在变量内生性，倍差法对于控制组的严格要求往往无法得到满足，故文中采用断点回归的分析方法，在无对照组的情形下，对我国风电产业2012~2015年的资产总计、主营业务收入以及发明专利数月度数据进行实证研究，探究民营资本的进入对我国风电产业的影响。实证结果表明，从短期看，民营资本的进入对我国风电产业规模与技术效率具有统计上的显著正面作用，具有一定的经济意义；另外，这一机制的推行对产业创新产生了显著的负面作用。     

Can Agents Be Better Off with Pay Caps?

A popular way to discipline the managers of companies or banks that got into trouble during the recent financial crisis has been to impose caps on managers' pay. Using a small extension of the standard principal–agent model, we argue that pay caps might serve the opposite purpose, because the agent might be better off with a pay cap. Specifically, we show that, given a fixed effort level to be implemented, the agent's expected utility can be decreasing in an upper bound for the agent's reward. The effect of pay caps on the general structure of optimal incentive contracts is also characterized. While an improvement of contracting information always helps the principal, it might increase or decrease the marginal cost of imposing pay caps.     

Microcredit games with noisy signals: Contagion and free-riding

The advent of microcredit financing has remarkably improved access to credit for the poor in many developing countries. Although several microcredit programs have adopted the joint liability scheme, economic theory suggests that joint liability could increase strategic default through contagion and free-riding. This paper aims at studying the extent of free-riding and contagion in joint liability lending. By using data from experimental repayment games conducted in Vietnam, with noisy signals that resemble actual microcredit programs, we found that subjects were motivated to free-ride under the joint liability scheme. While most empirical research in this area has focused on the problem of contagion, our findings point to the significance of investigating free-riding behavior under joint liability schemes. Analyses reveal that the free-riding tendency may be led by the irresponsiveness of repayment and shouldering behavior to the partner’s seemingly strategic default in the previous round.